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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the 
juvenile death penalty seventeen years ago in Thompson v. Oklahoma,1 and 
held that executing offenders who committed crimes while under the age of 
sixteen was unconstitutional.2  One year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty for youth 
ages sixteen and seventeen.3  The Court specifically noted that national 
standards demonstrated that the public supported the death penalty for 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.4  Despite these rulings, the Court 
recently opted to reexamine the constitutionality of the juvenile death 
penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the juvenile death penalty 
 1. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 2. See id. at 838 (concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the 
execution of such an individual). 
 3. See 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 4. See id. at 373 (suggesting that the “pattern of enacted laws” revealed no opposition 
to the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds).  But see Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
822-29 (summarizing how state laws, jury behavior and decency standards indicate a 
national consensus against executing fifteen-year-old criminal offenders). 
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was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and reversed seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons’ death 
sentence.5  Because the state court’s decision was contrary to the precedent 
in Stanford, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.6  On March 1, 2005, the 
Supreme Court decided the case in a landmark ruling, which affirmed the 
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court and overruled the prior Supreme 
Court decision in Stanford.7
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In determining the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, recent 
cases8 have questioned whether the practice constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.9  The state courts have the 
power to make this determination under the Eighth Amendment, as applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.10
The Supreme Court provided the framework for analyzing the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in two cases prior to Roper v. 
Simmons.11  In Thompson, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the 
juvenile death penalty by asking whether it comports with “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”12  The 
Court set out a list of broad criteria to consider in determining current 
national standards.13  In deciding Thompson, the Court ultimately held that 
the national consensus did not support the death penalty for those under the 
age of sixteen.14
 5. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), 
(explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States would draw a similar conclusion 
after engaging in a similar legal analysis), aff’d, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 6. See id., cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (Jan. 26, 2004). 
 7. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005), aff’g State ex rel. Simmons v. 
Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 8. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19. 
 9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 10. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(stating that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth 
Amendment by requiring courts to determine whether the death penalty is administered in 
an inhumane [cruel] manner or applied unequally [unusual] by reason of race, religion, or 
socio-economic factors). 
 11. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361 (describing how the Court will determine whether the 
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-23 (listing the 
criteria the Court reviews in ruling on the constitutionality of the death penalty). 
 12. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 13. See id. at 822 (listing state laws, jury behavior and current standards of decency as 
some of the criteria that the Court will consider).  The Court also examined various state 
laws regarding the rights of fifteen-year-olds, the weight of public opinion as evidenced by 
prominent national organizations such as the American Bar Association and the practice of 
other developed nations around the world.  Id. at 824-38. 
 14. See id. at 838. 
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One year later, the Court faced the issue of the death penalty for sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds in Stanford.15  The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the death penalty for these juvenile offenders, stating 
that the only indicator to consider should be the law of each state.16  These 
different approaches to examining the constitutionality of the death penalty 
have caused confusion as to what is the appropriate method of determining 
the national consensus relating to the juvenile death penalty. 
In the same year as Stanford, the Supreme Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of executing a mentally retarded person in Penry v. 
Lynaugh.17  The Court applied the Thompson framework of determining 
the national standards of decency and held that, based on the state laws in 
effect, there was no national consensus against executing mentally retarded 
offenders.18  Thirteen years later, the Court again examined a case 
challenging the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded individuals 
in Atkins v. Virginia.19  The Court reevaluated the national consensus and 
found that based on state laws, the frequency with which the punishment 
was used, opinions of national organizations and medical professionals, and 
the current standards of decency, the death penalty for mentally retarded 
individuals was unconstitutional, as it constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.20  The Court’s ruling in Atkins raised the question as to what 
extent national standards have changed such that the public consensus 
would now object to the juvenile death penalty for those under age eighteen 
at the time of commission of the crime. 
II.  FACTS 
In September 1993, Christopher Simmons, then age seventeen, plotted 
with two of his friends to commit burglary and murder.21  On September 8, 
1993, he and one other friend went to the home of Shirley Crook and 
 15. See 492 U.S. at 365-66 (recounting the facts of the two consolidated cases before 
the Court, one involving a juvenile who committed his capital crime at age sixteen and the 
other at age seventeen). 
 16. See id. at 377 (determining that the national consensus is best measured by looking 
at the state and federal laws).  The Court stated that including the opinion of national 
organizations and others is not an accurate measure of public opinion and, rather, a dubious 
foundation for constitutional law.  Id. 
 17. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
preclude the execution of a mentally retarded individual), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 18. See id. at 334 (noting that only two states prohibited the execution of mentally 
retarded individuals). 
 19. See 536 U.S. at 304-11 (describing the case of Daryl Atkins, a mildly retarded man 
sentenced to death for capital murder, abduction and armed robbery). 
 20. See id. at 315-16. 
 21. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (recounting 
the details of the crime), habeas corpus granted by State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 
S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005). 
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murdered her.22  Two days later, police arrested Simmons and he confessed 
to the crime.23  A jury convicted him of first-degree murder and sentenced 
him to death.24
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Simmons’s conviction in 1997, 
noting that the death penalty was not disproportionate when compared to 
the penalties imposed in other cases.25  Upon a writ of habeas corpus in 
2003, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned Simmons’s conviction and 
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.26  The 
judge stated that since the Supreme Court recently held the death penalty 
unconstitutional for mentally retarded persons in Atkins, it was likely the 
Court would now find the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile 
offenders who committed crimes when under the age of eighteen.27  In 
January 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.28
III.  THE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
To determine whether applying the death penalty to juveniles who were 
under eighteen at the time of the offense is constitutional, the Supreme 
Court examined the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”29  More specifically, the Court reviewed the 
national consensus relating to the issue and discussed whether, in its own 
judgment, the punishment is disproportionate for juveniles.30
A. Whether the National Consensus Supports Abolishing the 
 Juvenile Death Penalty for Offenders who Committed a  
Crime When Under the Age of Eighteen 
The Supreme Court concluded that a national consensus exists for the 
abolition of the death penalty for offenders under eighteen-years-old at the 
 22. See id. (describing how the defendant and his friend entered the victim’s residence, 
bound her and pushed her off of a railroad trestle into a river). 
 23. See id. at 170 (stating that Simmons even agreed to reenact the crime on videotape). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 191 (citing State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); State 
v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)).  Both cases involved sentencing 
juvenile offenders to the death penalty.  Id. 
 26. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413. 
 27. See id. (suggesting that, under the “evolving standards of decency” analysis, the 
U.S. Supreme Court would prohibit executing offenders convicted of committing a crime 
under the age of eighteen). 
 28. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, Roper 
v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (Jan. 26, 2004) (mem.). 
 29. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01). 
 30. See id. at 1192 (recognizing that the Court must reevaluate the factors for the 
juvenile death penalty in this case, even though the framework appears similar to the 
Stanford analysis). 
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time of the crime.31  Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court 
of Missouri utilized the analysis set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Atkins.32  Justice Stevens, in announcing the opinion in Atkins, 
reached the Court’s conclusion by examining the current legislative intent 
across the country, the frequency with which states imposed capital 
punishment, the opinion of national organizations, medical professionals, 
and international laws and finally the proportionality of the death penalty in 
light of today’s decency standards.33
The Supreme Court noted the similarities between the present case and 
Atkins regarding the national consensus.34  The Court found that thirty 
states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, which was the same number of 
states that prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded when the Court 
decided Atkins.35  The Court also noted that, since its decision in Stanford, 
only six states have executed juvenile offenders.36  Additionally, in the 
seminal Stanford case, the Governor of Kentucky spared Kevin Stanford’s 
life, suggesting that the state should abolish its practice of sentencing 
juvenile offenders to death.37
While most indicia of national consensus proved to be similar between 
Roper and Atkins, the Court noted that the change of the public’s opinion 
for the abolition of the juvenile death penalty was occurring more slowly 
than it did for the mentally retarded.38  The Court attributed this difference 
to the fact that many states already recognize the inappropriateness of 
executing juvenile offenders by limiting the penalty to those over age 
seventeen or eighteen.39  Despite this slower progress toward abolition, the 
 31. See id. at 1194 (proposing that all “objective indicia” of a national consensus point 
to a societal opposition to administering the juvenile death penalty). 
 32. See id. at 1192 (reasoning that the evidence in this case was analogous to the 
evidence in the Atkins case and thus it was appropriate to use a similar analysis); see also 
Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407 (justifying the use of the Atkins approach because the same 
factors the Court used in determining the constitutionality of the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded also apply to the death penalty for juveniles). 
 33. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313). 
 34. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (describing the evidence against the juvenile death 
penalty as parallel to the evidence against the death penalty for the mentally retarded). 
 35. See id. (noting that twelve states reject the death penalty altogether, while eighteen 
expressly prohibit juveniles from its application). 
 36. See id. (emphasizing that, in the past ten years, only three states have executed 
juvenile offenders). 
 37. See id. (demonstrating that states have increasingly refused to acknowledge the 
juvenile death penalty as a proportionate punishment). 
 38. See id. at 1193 (explaining that in the period between the two death penalty cases 
involving the mentally retarded, Penry and Atkins, sixteen states that allowed executions for 
mentally retarded offenders had abandoned the practice; whereas in the time between 
Stanford and Roper, only five states had moved to prohibit the juvenile death penalty). 
 39. See id. (referencing the fact that at the time of Stanford, twelve states prohibited 
execution of any juvenile under age eighteen, and fifteen states prohibited execution of 
those under age seventeen). 
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Court found the data compelling enough to conclude that the “consistency 
of the direction of change” demonstrated that the juvenile death penalty 
was phasing out of state criminal systems.40
After conducting the analysis above, the Court determined that the 
prohibition of the juvenile death penalty in a majority of states, the 
infrequency of its use and the clear trend towards eliminating the practice 
urged the conclusion that the national consensus supported abolition.41
B.  Whether the Juvenile Death Penalty Is a  
Disproportionate Punishment 
In assessing the proportionality of the death penalty to the crimes 
juveniles commit, the Court explored when the death penalty should be 
used under the Eighth Amendment.42  The Court focused its analysis on the 
maturity and intelligence of juvenile offenders, the purposes of the death 
penalty, and whether executing juveniles serves the purposes behind the 
punishment.43
The Court discussed how the death penalty is an extreme punishment 
deserving special attention under the Eighth Amendment.44  An underlying 
premise is that the states will apply the death penalty to a narrow group of 
crimes and offenders.45  The Court argued that juveniles cannot be 
classified as the worst offenders, and should instead be excluded from this 
narrow group to which the death penalty applies.46  To the Court, juveniles 
deserve special treatment because they lack maturity, make impulsive 
decisions, are vulnerable to peer pressure and negative influences and lack 
the character of fully-grown adults.47  Guided by its decision in Thompson, 
the Court concluded that the characteristics inherent to juveniles preclude 
 40. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315) (discussing the significance of the fact that no 
death penalty state had lowered the minimum age, and that a group of states had chosen to 
abandon the practice altogether). 
 41. See id. at 1194 (pointing to the evidence to show that juveniles deserve similar 
treatment regarding the death penalty as the mentally retarded) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
316 (determining the evidence in that case made the mentally retarded “categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal”)). 
 42. See id. at 1194-96 (reasoning why juveniles under the age of eighteen do not 
deserve this severe of a punishment). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 1194 (observing that throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence, the 
justices have held that states should only use the death penalty for the most serious crimes 
and for the most reprehensible criminals). 
 45. See id. at 1195 (noting that the Court has previously held that states cannot sentence 
certain groups of individuals to death, such as juveniles under sixteen, the criminally insane 
and the mentally retarded). 
 46. See id. (listing the three differences between juvenile and adult offenders that makes 
the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment). 
 47. See id. (emphasizing that because of these differences, wrongful behavior on the 
part of a juvenile is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult). 
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the imposition of the death penalty to those under age eighteen.48
The Court analyzed whether the desire for retribution or deterrence of 
capital crimes justified imposing the death penalty on juveniles under 
eighteen in order to determine the proportionality to the punishment.49  
Regarding retribution, the Court based its reasoning on its holding in Atkins 
and posited that retribution was not proportional in juvenile death penalty 
cases since the state would impose the punishment on someone who was 
less culpable due to “youth and immaturity.”50  The Court reached a similar 
conclusion regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty on 
juveniles.51  The Court noted that the lack of evidence proving a deterrent 
effect amongst juveniles led to the conclusion that the effect was 
insignificant.52  Therefore, the Court determined that the social purposes of 
retribution and deterrence do not provide justification for use of the death 
penalty for those under eighteen.53
In concluding that the juvenile death penalty is disproportionate for 
offenders under eighteen, the Court also discussed how no other country 
officially sanctions the practice except for the United States.54  The Court 
explained that establishing a bright line rule at age eighteen conforms to 
society’s view of when a juvenile becomes an adult.55
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the juvenile death penalty 
 48. See id. at 1195-96 (arguing that juveniles have a greater chance of reforming 
themselves); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38 (stating that the punishment must be 
proportionate to the personal culpability of the defendant and that juveniles are less culpable 
than adult offenders due to their vulnerability and other traits inherent in youth). 
 49. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1196 (noting that given juveniles’ “diminished capacity” it 
is less likely that the death penalty’s purposes will apply to juveniles in the same manner as 
for adults). 
 50. See id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
 51. See id. (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837) (noting that juveniles are less susceptible 
to deterrence than adults). 
 52. See id. (conceding that while the efficacy of a criminal penalty is usually reserved 
for debate among the legislature, the absence of data is important here in inferring that 
juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by this punishment). 
 53. See id. at 1196-97 (stressing that the Court cannot overlook the fact that many 
juveniles commit brutal crimes, but finding that the brutality of a particular crime would not 
outweigh the mitigating factor of a juvenile’s diminished capacity). 
 54. See id. (clarifying that while international law is not controlling when interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution, the courts have considered it in determining what is “cruel and 
unusual” under the Eighth amendment); see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting the 
international disapproval for the execution of mentally retarded people); Thompson, 487 
U.S. at 830-31 (recognizing that other Western countries have abolished the juvenile death 
penalty). 
 55. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (noting that the Thompson Court drew the line for the 
death penalty at sixteen without objection and, considering the changing standards of 
decency, the Court held that the Thompson logic applied to raising the death penalty age to 
eighteen). 
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raises new questions of whether the Court will abolish the death penalty as 
a whole.  The Court’s analysis placed high value on the “evolving 
standards of decency” as measured by criteria determining a national 
consensus as well as the independent judgment of judges.  Justice Scalia, 
dissenting from this opinion, criticized this new approach to Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.56
The Court’s ruling immediately affected pending and future cases 
concerning the juvenile death penalty.57  This decision vacated seventy-two 
juvenile death sentences in over twelve states.58  Moreover, many experts 
view the Court’s analysis as an opportunity to go beyond the juvenile death 
penalty and apply it to other special classes of people.59  The Court may 
find other characteristics of offenders or categories of crimes that may 
further limit the use of the death penalty.60
One aspect of the decision raises questions about future American 
constitutional analysis.  The Court noted that its decision conforms to 
current international law.61  Beyond the current issue of the juvenile death 
penalty, the Court may refer to international law in resolving other 
constitutional questions, a possibility which some justices find troubling.62
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons is a significant step 
toward the abolishment of the death penalty.  The Court held that the 
 56. See id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to support the majority’s decision 
because it does not rely on objective factors); see also Bill Mears, High Court: Juvenile 
Death Penalty Unconstitutional (Mar. 1, 2005) (detailing Scalia’s opinion that the analysis 
in the Roper case was nothing more than the personal views of the justices and a “snapshot 
of American public opinion at a particular point in time”), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/01/scotus.death.penalty/index.html. 
 57. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (explaining that Stanford is no longer good law and 
cannot be relied upon to carry out executions). 
 58. See Mark Hansen, Ruling May Spur New Death Penalty Challenges: Abolition 
Unlikely, But Experts See Limits to Capital Punishment for Other Groups, 4 ABA J. 
EREPORT 9 (March 4, 2005) (reporting that the Roper decision also prohibits the twenty 
states that allow juvenile executions from imposing such sentences), at 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m4sct.html. 
 59. See id. (stating that the reasoning of the Court opens the door to claims by 
“[eighteen to twenty]-year-olds, minorities, the mentally ill, foreign nationals and other 
classes of people”). 
 60. See id. (suggesting that it is possible that the death penalty will be further restricted, 
but that the current composition of the Court makes it unlikely that it will be abolished). 
 61. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (explaining that only the United States officially 
sanctioned the juvenile death penalty). 
 62. See id. at 1225-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court cited to international 
treaties and conventions that the U.S. President has not yet signed nor has the Senate 
ratified).  Contra id. at 1215-16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court has 
referred to international law over the past fifty years in previous decisions relating to the 
Eighth Amendment and that the Court derives value in knowing that their rulings comport 
with standards of decency prevailing in other countries). 
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juvenile death penalty for offenders who were older than fifteen but 
younger than eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime is 
impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution as cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court’s decision opens 
up the possibility for other classes of offenders to propose more limitations 
to the death penalty in the future, potentially leading to a complete 
abolition of the practice. 
JENNIFER ESWARI BORRA 
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